

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/29/201

Agency Information

AGENCY: SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER: 157-10014-10047
RECORD SERIES: HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: 07-H-05

Document Information

ORIGINATOR: SSCIA
FROM:
TO:

TITLE:

DATE: 05/06/1976
PAGES: 80

SUBJECTS:

CASTRO, FIDEL
OPERATION MONGOOSE
JMWAVE
CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE: TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS: Consulted
CURRENT STATUS: Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW: 02/26/1998

OPENING CRITERIA:

COMMENTS: Box 2

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Vol. 1 OF 1

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The United States Senate R3014

Report of Proceedings

EX-100
3/2/77
29

Hearing held before

EX-100
4/19/77
26

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Thursday, May 6, 1976

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Vaste turned over
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CONTENTS

Seymour H. Bolton

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张永成 王作龙

愛知大学 文学部 国文学科 卒業生 佐々木 孝一 氏

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EXECUTIVE SESSION

Thursday, May 6, 1976

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 o'clock
P.M., in Room 608, the Carroll Arms Hotel, the Honorable
Richard S. Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Also present: Jim Johnston and Paul Wallach, Professional
Staff Members.

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PROCEEDINGS

1 Senator Schweiker. I guess we will swear you in, so if
2 you will stand up and raise your right hand, do you solemnly
3 swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the
4 whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so Help you God?
5

6 Yes, I do.

7 Senator Schweiker. Be seated.

8 Mr. Johnston. Would you state for the record your full
9 name?

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1 TESTIMONY OF [REDACTED]

2 ACCOMPANIED BY [REDACTED] AND SEYMOUR R. BOLTEN

3 [REDACTED] My name is [REDACTED]

4 Mr. Johnston. And I understand that is [REDACTED]

5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED] That is correct.

7 Mr. Johnston. Mr. Bolten, would you state your full name?

8 Mr. Bolten. Seymour Bolten, Seymour R. Bolten.

9 Mr. Johnston. And John, [REDACTED]

10 [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]

12 Mr. Johnston. And Mr. Bolten and [REDACTED] would you
13 state your capacity in this session today?

14 Mr. Bolten. I am chief of the Review Staff of the CIA,
15 and responsible for dealings with the Senate Select Committee.

16 [REDACTED] I am Special Assistant to the DDC, sitting
17 in here as an alternate monitor.

18 Mr. Johnston. And the discussion that has taken place
19 prior to going on the record today basically has resulted in a
20 decision to have Mr. Bolten and [REDACTED] attend as monitors
21 to this session, and do you understand that, [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED] Yes, I do.

23 Mr. Johnston. [REDACTED] what was your capacity with
24 Agency in November, 1963?

25 [REDACTED] In November, 1963, I was the Chief of Station

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1 of the CIA operation that was based in Miami, Florida, targeted
2 as its primarily responsibility for the Cuban operation.

3 Mr. Johnston. Mr. Wallach has reminded me to remind you of
4 a procedural matter which, you understand you have the right
5 to counsel.

6 Yes, I do.

7 Mr. Johnston. And you understand you have a right not to
8 answer questions if you don't wish to, or not to answer questions
9 until you consult with Counsel, is that correct?

10 That is correct.

11 Mr. Johnston. And you are appearing here voluntarily
12 without counsel.

13 That is correct.

14 Mr. Johnston. And going back to substantive questions, how
15 long did you remain as Chief of Station?

16 What were the dates of your service?

17 Well, I arrived, or became involved in the
18 Cuban operations in the early 1962, and I stayed there until
19 approximately June of 1965.

20 Senator Schweiker. What month again in '62?

21 Early '63. I didn't give you the month,
22 Senator, because I originally came down to Florida to conduct
23 a survey of this operation to see what possibilities could be
24 carried out in terms of the collection of intelligence. I
25 later filed a report on it, and I was later assigned down to

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1 Senator Schweiker. And this was called JMWAVE, was it?

2 [] That is the cryptonym that the Agency used
3 for the Miami station.

4 Senator Schweiker. And to whom in that chain of command
5 at the CIA did you report when you were the operating head?

6 [] There were different people at different
7 times. When I first went to Miami, the task force commander was
8 Mr. William Harvey. He reported then to the DDP, who reported
9 to the Director of Central Intelligence. At a later point in
10 the operation, Mr. Harvey moved on to other tasks, and Mr.
11 Fitzgerald became the chief of that particular unit, and then
12 after Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Hart was the head of that
13 particular unit.

14 And between Harvey and Fitzgerald, I think there was a
15 short period of time when a fellow by the name of []
16 was the acting chief of that particular unit, or the chief.
17 I have forgotten the exact arrangement there.

18 Senator Schweiker. Sometime during this period did it
19 change its title from Task Force W to SAS, is that correct
20 or not correct, or do I have it mixed up?

21 [] My recollection of that chronology was that
22 it was first called SAS and then became Task Force W, and then
23 became integrated back into WH Division, which was the Western
24 Hemisphere Division.

25 Senator Schweiker. SAS preceded Task Force W?

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1 [] Yes. That's off the top of my head. That's
2 my recollection of it.

3 Mr. Johnston. Just for the record, I think it was the
4 other way around. Task Force W was first and SAS was second.

5 Senator Schweiker. But in sum and substance your duties
6 were basically the same, whether it was Task Force W or SAS
7 under Harvey and Fitzgerald, was that not true?

8 [] Well, I think you have to break this period
9 up into two phases, Senator. The early phase, 1962, was
10 focused on coming up with an appraisal of what kind of an
11 operation could be run against Cuba in the context which existed
12 at that time; in other words, after the Bay of Pigs, after the
13 post mortems had been conducted. The Administration at the time
14 decided that they wanted to take another look at Cuba as an
15 intelligence and national security problem. Therefore, an
16 assessment was to be made in the early period of time as to
17 what kind of an operation could be run in pursuit of U.S.
18 policy objectives, which was to see if Fidel Castro's
19 government could be removed. And when that assessment was
20 conducted as to what kind of intelligence operations could be
21 conducted, what kind of paramilitary or other operations could
22 be run, that was an initial phase, and that phase was approved
23 and put into effect. But as that operation was being put into
24 effect the missile crisis came upon us, so that that was when
25 really carried to its logical conclusion because the operation

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1 then shifted.

2 Senator Schweiker. After October of '62?

3 No, prior to October of '62, because the
4 Cuban crisis was in October of '62, but the buildup preceded
5 it, and our operations which were collecting intelligence in
6 Cuba detected this buildup as it was unfolding. Therefore,
7 the national priority became now how do you take action against
8 Fidel Castro, but what is the nature of this Soviet buildup.
9 And therefore the operation changed.

10 Then after the Cuban missile crisis of October of 1962,
11 the problem became one of monitoring the Soviet disengagement
12 from Cuba, and then there was another phase after that when
13 the Soviets were out, Castro was clearly recognized as the
14 established power in Cuba, and the problem became one of
15 looking at Cuba in the context of was there some other way to
16 get a political change in Cuba other than by military action
17 or by paramilitary action. In other words, the emphasis
18 shifted to looking at the Castro military establishment to
19 see if a coup could be pulled from within, to see if economic
20 pressures could be put on the Castro regime.

21 So the tasking of this particular unit did change, and
22 change of nuances and degrees during this period, but in our
23 professional sense it was focused on the Cuban targets. So
24 in that sense you are correct, but it did go through various
25 changes as events changed.

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I've heard the cryptonym Operation MONGOOSE.

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1 but that didn't impact on my life at that particular time.

2 Senator Schweiker. All right.

3 Mr. Johnston. Moving to the time of the Kennedy
4 assassination, were you Chief of Station and in Miami when
5 the President was assassinated?

6 Yes, I was the Chief of Station and I was
7 in Miami.

8 Mr. Johnston. You were physically in Miami on November
9 22nd.

10 Yes, I was.

11 Mr. Johnston. Did you receive any orders through CIA
12 channels to conduct an investigation in any fashion into the
13 assassination of the President?

14 Well, my recollection of that was that we
15 had requests for name traces at the time that Oswald was
16 arrested, and that was our contribution to the investigation.

17 Mr. Johnston. Did you receive any order in the form of
18 a cable or any other fashion to conduct an investigation?

19 I don't recall receiving one, but if you
20 showed me a cable, I would have to comment on it. In other
21 words this was in 1963. This is 1976, and as you know from
22 record, I've been in an awful lot of high volume projects
23 over time, and I don't think it is likely that I would recall
24 a specific cable, you know, on a particular day. I mean,
25 have been in Berlin, Laos, Vietnam. My life has been active.

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Figure 1

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associated with you folks at that time?

[] Well, I don't recall that specific name, Senator, at this time.

We did have a relationship with the DRE. We did deal with a number of their top leaders.

Mr. Johnston. Let me come back to that later.

Did you receive any orders not to investigate an area, or not to conduct an investigation of any kind?

[] No, I don't recall receiving any such orders.

Mr. Johnston. At this time period, November 22nd, November 23rd, 1963, what was your capability in regard to conducting an investigation among Cuban exiles, and with Cuban sources?

[] Well, in relationship to Cubans living in the United States, I would say that our capability was quite good.

Now, if you are referring to our capability to conduct an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was limited. I have to know where specifically you are referring to. In other words, if you're talking in the area --

Mr. Johnston. First I'm talking domestically of Cuban exiles in the United States, and your answer is --

[] That it would have been quite good.

Mr. Johnston. Secondly, with regard to collecting intelligence as to possible Cuban involvement --

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26 Mr. Johnston. I guess I don't quite understand the...



1 Because the CIA did have responsibility and certainly the
2 capability to collect information from foreign countries.

3 [] Well, — had no reason at the particular time
4 to feel that there was any kind of a case, hard information,
5 that the Cubans were behind the assassination.

6 In other words, you know, at that particular period in
7 time there were a large number of rumors, gossip, in the
8 Cuban Community. Those that came to our attention were
9 reported, and we tried to put them in some perspective, that
10 is, who was the individual, what access did he have to this
11 data and so forth.

12 But we had no persuasion that this was being mounted
13 by the Cubans at that particular time.

14 Mr. Wallace. I would like to ask a couple of questions
15 by way of background and let him go right back to his line
16 of questioning.

17 Taking the period as exemplary, October of 1963 --

18 [] October of '63, okay.

19 Mr. Wallace. Which I take it would be fairly indicative
20 of what was going on in May, June, July and August of the
21 same year. I want to pick a fairly standard month for that
22 period.

23 [] ba-uh.

24 Mr. Wallace. Before the assassination.

25 It's my understanding that in addition to getting pos-

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1 intelligence from refugees, etc., coming to this country,
2 that your station did operate agents and did have sources,
3 whatever terms you want to use, inside Cuba, is that correct?

4 [] Yes, we did have sources inside Cuba.

5 Mr. Wallach. Could you briefly for the record --

6 (Pause)

7 Mr. Wallach. What I'd like to do very briefly for the
8 record, as you know, I think you had an interview with Mr.
9 Dixon and went into it with you, but very briefly describe
10 generally the type of operations that your station was conducting
11 vis-a-vis Cuba.

12 [] Well, in the first instance we were engaged
13 in foreign intelligence collection activities, that is, trying
14 to establish information which related to the plans, intentions
15 and capabilities of the Cuban government. We were also
16 involved in counterintelligence operations, that is, trying
17 to figure out what the Cubans were doing in terms of their
18 intelligence operations in the United States, or through the
19 United States into Central and Latin America. We were also
20 involved in propaganda operations against Cuba, and covert
21 action in the sense of trying to establish contact with
22 dissident military personalities in Cuba.

23 Mr. Wallach. Without naming names, did you in the time
24 period I've been talking about, October of 1963, have any
25 sources or agents fairly highly placed within the Cuban

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government?

[redacted] I don't think -- there I'd have to get a better definition from you of what is highly placed. If you are talking about Fidel Castro and his immediate entourage -- Mr. Wallach. People who could possibly have been in meetings or dinner with Castro, or meetings with Castro. I don't know enough about how Castro operated.

[redacted] I would say if you are talking about somebody who was a member of his immediate entourage and who was dealing with him in a governmental sense, then the answer is no, but we did have people who were on the periphery of this. That is, they wouldn't have been major participants, but they would have been in social contact with Castro or members of his entourage.

Mr. Wallach. Now about persons within the DGI, whatever the correct name for Cuban intelligence is.

[redacted] Well, again as I mentioned earlier, we had no staff officer penetration of the Cuban intelligence service. We had some reporting on people who were in touch with various leaders in the Cuban intelligence, and it was all in social or family or other context that these people were reporting on.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall at any time in 1962 or 1963 the fact being brought to your attention that certain Cuban agents out of New York City were actually beginning to run

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assassination plots against Cuban exile leaders down in Miami?

Out of New York? No, I don't recall that.

One thing, just before we leave this, so we don't have an incomplete record, you asked me the other kinds of operations that we were running. We were running a full scope of paramilitary operations against Cuba. That is, we were putting people back into Cuba who may have come from a particular province, and who then went into the bush and lived in the bush, and we kept them supplied with food, arms, basic equipment. We did have radio contact with them. We were involved in raids against the Cuban coast, we were involved in putting caches into the Cuban coast.

Senator Schweiker. Does that finish your point?

Yes, sir, that's roughly it.

Senator Schweiker. Following up this other question, was any one part of your job plugging intelligence leaks at this given time?

Was there any concern during your timeframe that you were involved in Cuban operations of intelligence leaks from our country to theirs through the Cuban intelligence system?

Was this ever a consideration or priority of you as Station Chief?

Yes, in terms of -- well, yes, the answer to that is yes. Now, let me elaborate on it.

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We had a jurisdictional problem. For instance, a Cuban agent detected in the United States or being suspected of being a Cuban agent would have been a case that we would have had to have coordinated with the FBI, and essentially the FBI took primary action on this.

I recall one case where we detected a Cuban agent in the United States, and the case was transferred to the Bureau, and it involved a fundamental jurisdictional issue, which was clearly the Bureau's right to take that particular case over. So in that sense, the primary responsibility in the Miami area in the counterintelligence sense that you are discussing, Senator, would have rested with the Bureau.

Senator Schweiker. Did you ever attempt to find a leak by placing one of our agents into the system to plug a leak? I mean, was it ever that magnitude of concern attached?

[] No, I don't recall that kind of a case. In other words, I do recall cases where people came out of Cuba, gave us a story that we did not necessarily believe, where we would turn them back and send them back to Cuba, so that over a longer period of time we could determine what it is that they were really after, what they were trying to do. In other words, were they trying to come into the United States to penetrate and immigrate, were they trying to get in touch with American intelligence, and if so, why. But it was all done back into the Cuban context.

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1 Senator Schweiker. This is a tough question to answer,
2 but at that period of time, how successful in your opinion was
3 the Cuban intelligence system in doing some of that penetration
4 and I realize that we had a lot of Cuban exiles here, and it was
5 pretty hard to tell the players from the scorecard we are in.
6 It is a tough relevant question, but I wonder how you would
7 analyze it.

8 [] Well, I think it would be fair to say that
9 given the Cuban propensity to talk -- in other words, you have
10 to start off with a fundamental point of departure that if you
11 get two Cubans that have got a secret, it is not going to be
12 a secret, because they do talk, and therefore they all constantly
13 talk.

14 Our biggest problem in maintaining security of our own
15 operations, such as an infiltration operation into Cuba to
16 put in a cache or run a commando raid or put a person back
17 in was to maintain security. The only way we could do it would
18 be to take all participants of that operation and take them
19 out of the Cuban community and in fact isolate them for a week
20 or ten days or more prior to the mounting of the operation.
21 And they wouldn't talk, and we could know where they would
22 be constantly, 24 hours a day. And within that milieu, I can
23 be safe to say that the Cuban intelligence service did not
24 have some agents and could be expected to have a general feel for
25 the pulse of the community at that time.

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1 Senator Schweiker. During that same time frame, or
2 during the time frame that you were Station Chief, what are
3 some other Cuban groups that you worked with that come to
4 mind? I have mentioned DRE. I realize there were several
5 different ones?

6 Any others particularly that were helpful and worked with
7 you like the DRE?

8 [] Well, the DRE was the main group because
9 what had happened is after the -- or prior to the Bay of Pigs
10 there was a great collaboration between CIA and a number of
11 these groups. After the Bay of Pigs, the dialogue with these
12 groups sort of dried up, and during my tenure, the main group
13 that we worked with in that sense as an organizational entity
14 was the DRE because they had a lot of active, imaginative
15 young student leaders who had contacts throughout the Western
16 Hemisphere who were equally interested in using them in the
17 propaganda and covert action sense in Central and Latin
18 America as we were actually using them against Cuba itself.

19 Senator Schweiker. Where did Alpha 66 fit or not fit
20 into that?

21 [] We did not have an organizational relationship
22 with Alpha 66. Alpha 66 was in being. We monitored their
23 activities so that we would know when they were going to
24 launch against Cuba. We may have had people who at one time
25 or another were in our paramilitary teams who left or fit

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one reason or another, and may have ended up in Alpha 66.

Senator Schweiker. We realize that one of the other intelligence agencies might have had a liaison or working operation with Alpha 66, not the CIA, is that correct?

[] Yes, I think -- you know, in the back of my memory I believe that one of the military services --

Senator Schweiker. Might it have been the Army Intelligence?

[] My recollection, it was probably a military service, and it probably was the Army, but I would have to check the record.

Senator Schweiker. We also were informed, and I just wondered if this was your recollection, that at some point some of the operations got a little bit overlapping and duplicating, and that the boats would -- I'm simplifying it of course, but that the boats weren't coordinated too well, and at one point it got to be a problem with whoever else was involved, and that finally an agreement was worked out with Army intelligence that all the boats would be supplied by CIA instead of having them sort of fly-by-nighting and possibly mess up some things because of duplication or confusion.

Do you recall any of that at all?

[] Well, I think there were periods when the U.S. Government was putting a clamp-down on refugee groups going out, and the whole apparatus of government, Coast Guard

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1 Customs, Immigration, Naturalization, FBI, CIA, were working
2 together to try to keep these operations from going to Cuba.

3 In that context, the military did have some problems, but
4 my recollection of that, Senator, is that we put them into the
5 coordination mechanism that we had for getting boats out. I
6 don't recall our taking their people --

7 Senator Schweiker. I might have stated it wrong.

8 What do you mean by a coordination mechanism?

9 [] Well, for instance, we had, let's say, for
10 the month of October 1963, we would draw up an operational
11 plan in September. In the course of that operational plan and
12 geared to the lack of the moon, we would have a number of
13 infiltration missions scheduled to get in caches. We'd have
14 a number of missions scheduled to put in teams or to take
15 people out of Cuba. We'd have a number of missions
16 scheduled to conduct commerce raids against fixed installations.

17 So we would draw up the schedule and coordinate the
18 schedule with the appropriate agencies like Coast Guard or
19 Customs so that we could move our boats in and out and not
20 cause the U.S. Government to expend bank bills and money in
21 pursuing our boats.

22 Senator Schweiker. I think that is what I had in mind.

23 [] And therefore, on this schedule, when we
24 worked that out, we therefore would task on the military
25 operations and work this out so that there was a central

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1 clearinghouse, and the U. S. government had a grip on what it
2 was doing in this clandestine field.

3 Senator Schweiker. To your recollection, besides Army
4 intelligence, were there any other intelligence services that
5 were involved to any extent with that general picture?

6 [] Well, with the mutation of that, as I recall,
7 the Navy had some activities in and out of Guantanamo, and there
8 were some discussions at various times on how their people
9 in Guantanamo could be supported, and the people were going
10 in and out of Guantanamo.

11 Senator Schweiker. Were the Army operations very extensive
12 or not compared to yours?

13 [] No. Compared to ours, they were infinitesimal.

14 Senator Schweiker. And Navy?

15 [] Navy, as I think all of this was limited to
16 the perimeter all around Guantanamo, and Guantanamo.

17 Senator Schweiker. All right.

18 Mr. Wallach. I just want to ask you a couple of more
19 questions as I was going to before.

20 I realize this question is going to your expertise, and
21 if you have any trouble with definitional terms, let's get
22 them straight.

23 [] Right.

24 Mr. Wallach. Did JMWAVE itself as an entity have the
25 capability to conduct an investigation to determine whether

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1 not there had been Cuban involvement in the assassination of
2 President Kennedy in 1963?

3 [] I don't think there would have been a real
4 world capability. I mean, if you're talking in my terms of
5 conducting an investigation of this type in Cuba, which would
6 have been professionally sound, that people could have put
7 confidence in, I think the answer to that is probably no. I'm
8 giving you an opinion. That is my opinion.

9 Mr. Wallach. Let's go back to terms, then. I'm not talking
10 about an investigation where you could obviously have the
11 freedom to go up and interview anyone you wanted to interview.

12 [] no. We are talking about through clandestine
13 resources. In other words, to conduct this kind of investigation,
14 you know, in my view, you would have had to have had
15 a penetration of one or more of the Cuban intelligence services.
16 The penetration would have had to have been in the 26th of July
17 Movement, and had enough support with the top leadership that
18 it could have moved freely in and out of a specific circle.
19 We did not have that kind of resource in depth to conduct
20 that kind of investigation.

21 Mr. Wallach. Were there ever any discussions at that
22 time that you remember between yourself, Fitzgerald, Helms,
23 anyone, as to whether or not the CIA did have the capability
24 to conduct such an investigation?
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1 [] I don't recall such a discussion, but again,
2 the reason for it was, it was essentially felt at that time, as
3 name traces were done, the whole mood and the whole atmosphere
4 was that this was a case that was being investigated by the
5 FBI. It was their jurisdictional problem.

6 Mr. Wallach. Did the FBI, to your knowledge, have the
7 capacity to investigate or to conduct any sort of investigation
8 inside Cuba?

9 [] Inside Cuba? No, I don't think they did.

10 Mr. Wallach. Did you have direct contact with anyone
11 from the Bureau on a continuing basis from the FBI?

12 Mr. Johnston. Let's restructure that whole area.

13 What was the liaison relationship between JMWAVE, the
14 Bureau and Florida?

15 [] There was a direct liaison on a daily working
16 basis, if this was required, between JMWAVE and the Miami
17 Field Office, I think it was called, as a separate field
18 office.

19 Mr. Johnston. At what level was this liaison conducted,
20 directly with you?

21 [] No. This was conducted at at least three
22 levels that I can recall: periodically, the Chief of the Field
23 Office and I would meet to review problems. If we had any
24 particular problems, or frankly, just to get together just
25 to make sure that we did not have any problems. There was

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1 direct liaison on a working level between the people in the
2 Counterintelligence shop of the Station and what I think the
3 Bureau used to call the Tamale Squad, which were former
4 Bureau agents who had been down in Havana, who had left when
5 Fidel came into power, and were still working in Miami. And the
6 third liaison was essentially with people who were working
7 specific cases, where the same trace mechanism between ourselves
8 and the Bureau would show some mutuality of interest in a
9 particular case.

10 For instance, as an example, the Bureau might call up and
11 say, look, what do you know about Juan Jose Gonzalez of the
12 Second Front of the Secarmbrat. We'll say, okay, we'll take
13 the question, we'll do a trace, prepare the answer, and someone
14 would go down and talk to them. So it was close. I would
15 say it was close.

16 Mr. Johnston. Did you ever do the reverse? Did you ever
17 ask the Bureau for information?

18 Yes. We traced specific people with the
19 Bureau.

20 Mr. Johnston. In November, after the assassination of
21 President Kennedy, did you personally meet with anybody from
22 the FBI regarding the investigation?

23 I don't recall meeting or that specific
24 subject.

25 Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether anyone in INWAVE met

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1 with the FBI in regard to the FBI investigation in Florida?

2 [] My recollection is that this name trace
3 procedure was working, whatever they were working in relationship
4 to their investigation, was being run through us. In other
5 words, how many traces, who was being traced, I couldn't answer
6 that.

7 Mr. Johnston. Well, name traces are one thing. I guess
8 I am talking one step above that. Did anyone in JMWAVE to
9 your knowledge discuss with anyone in FBI in Florida the
10 CIA's capability to assist the FBI investigation?

11 [] I have no way of answering that. I don't
12 recall that. I don't recall that kind of thing. You know,
13 this is -- you know, we're talking about 1963. This is 13
14 years ago, and I keep telling you, you know, I've had a busy,
15 active life.

16 Senator Schweiker. You are doing so far very well.

17 [] I feel you are pressing me on something that
18 is almost unreasonable. I mean, I don't recall each and
19 every conversation. I mean, I had a 301 man station.

20 Mr. Johnston. I agree with you in that, but you are
21 describing name traces, which you do seem to recall, but I'm
22 saying was there anything beyond name traces that you recall?
23 Was there any assistance given beyond name traces?

24 Senator Schweiker. Was there any higher level invest.,
25 that you can recall?

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1 [] The reason this name trace thing sticks in
2 my mind, frankly, is because of the name traces that were con-
3 ducted on Oswald when we got the hit, and I recall, the hit
4 was made on the fact that there was the discussion and debate
5 between Oswald and the DRE fellow, and we were tracing a lot
6 of names at that time, and in conjunction with this particular
7 event, once people were arrested and detained and there was
8 some reason to expect that there was what I called an investi-
9 gative follow-up, you know, you've got to start from some
10 fact. What was the fact? You had a name, an address, a
11 telephone number, that kind of tracing was going on. That
12 is what impacts on me, what is this, you know, 13 years later.

13 Senator Schweiker. In connection with that, the group,
14 the DRE group, there was some allegation that Oswald, I guess
15 part of it is reality for sure, that he tried to penetrate
16 the group himself by coming in when he was in New Orleans and
17 infiltrate it on his own, which I guess is known, and what
18 is in doubt, there was an allegation that while he was doing
19 that, that he possibly talked of assassinating Kennedy or had
20 paid money to assassinate Kennedy.

21 Does any of that conversation strike any bells or recall
22 tion with regard to DRE?

23 [] No, it doesn't, Senator, and I think I'll
24 go on to explain this to you as to what was the nature of the
25 relationship with the DRE. In other words, we had a


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21 Senator Schweiker. Do you recall who your control
24 relationship was with that particular group? I assume the
25 was a CIA control relationship.



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1 [] Yes, there was a particular man that was in
2 liaison with that group, and there were several during that period
3 of time.

4 Senator Schweiker. Might it have been Carlos Bringuier,
5 the name we mentioned before?

6 [] You mentioned the name, and to be honest, the
7 name doesn't ring a bell. But is he also known as Fatty?

8 Senator Schweiker. Well, you've got me now.

9 [] Well, every Cuban has an alias, like they
10 call him El Gordo or something like that.

11 Senator Schweiker. Well, it might be. He fits it.

12 [] Well, you might be able to answer this. Was
13 he the fellow that was on the DRE boat that raided Havana?
14 I have trouble watching up some of these names, and frankly,
15 that name doesn't ring a bell, but I might have known him as
16 El Gordo, and he was on the boat, and we dealt with different
17 people.

18 (Discussion off the record.)

19 Mr. Johnston. Let me show you WAVE cable 8049, dated
20 22 November '63, which is your report on this DRE matter, and
21 that cable basically indicates that you got information from
22 DRE about Oswald.

23 Is that correct?

24 [] Yes. The wording of this particular cable
25 shows that we did get from the DRE files this information.

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1 Mr. Johnston. My question to you is, of partial signifi-
2 cance, and that is the fact that that cable says that Oswald
3 "allegedly lives in home of Foreign Minister for two months."

4 My question is that this allegation that he lived in
5 the home of the Soviet foreign minister has never been
6 substantiated through any other source, and I wonder whether
7 you have a recollection of going back to DRE to see where
8 they got that information.

9 [] No, I don't have a recollection of going back
10 on that specific cable.

11 Mr. Johnston. Do you have any recollection of headquarters
12 ever coming back to you and saying what is the source of that?

13 [] You know, I don't see how you can expect me
14 to remember that, really. You know, in the course of a day,
15 a normal day, I might read a thousand cables.

16 Senator Schweiker. Well, does the fact that he might
17 have lived in a Soviet foreign minister's home for two months
18 ring a bell?

19 [] Well, you know, showing me that cable, I
20 have to accept the cable at face value. That is what it says.
21 I acknowledge that is what it says. The cable says we got it
22 from the DRE. I accept it on face value. That incident,
23 the foreign minister's residence, does not ring a bell with me.

24 Senator Schweiker. So you wouldn't know offhand where the
25 allegation came from.

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1 [] No, I don't know. We would have to go back
2 to them and their criteria for carding might not coincide with
3 ours. In other words, many of these Cuban groups were prone
4 to act on rumors. They were prone to publicize things that
5 were not true. The DRE had a record of publicizing, embroidering,
6 elaborating on things, and therefore we treated a lot of their
7 material with caution.

8 Senator Schweiker. Right.

9 Go ahead, Paul.

10 Mr. Wallach. Generally, now, and I'm not asking for
11 specific conversations at all. I think it is entirely true,
12 it is a caveat throughout this entire thing, we are talking
13 about 13 years ago, millions of matters ago. But generally, do
14 you recall whether or not the FBI, the people you dealt with
15 had any general knowledge of the CIA's capability inside
16 Cuba to get information?

17 [] Well, I think it would be fair to say that
18 the FBI knew the kinds of operations that we were running, and
19 I think they could have drawn certain conclusions about, you
20 know, what our capability might have been. That is, let me
21 put this in perspective. I'm talking about the people in
22 Miami. Occasionally when I would come to Washington for
23 conferences, I would meet somebody like Papich. He happened
24 to be, you know, friends, and I would talk to him and say
25 how are you doing, how are things going, what kind of activity

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1 are you involved in?

2 Zapich probably have a feel for the scope of our activity,
3 but whether he would have an appreciation of the kinds of
4 specific sources, I doubt it.

5 Mr. Wallach. In other words, you would doubt whether or
6 not anyone in the Bureau would have known whether or not you
7 had an extremely high level source in Castro's entourage.

8 [] I doubt that they would know that.

9 Mr. Wallach. At any time, do you recall after the assassi-
10 nation anyone from the Bureau, even from the Miami field office
11 or from headquarters, through Zapich, through your headquarters,
12 contacting you to determine whether or not you had the capability
13 to conduct investigations on Cuba?

14 [] No, I don't recall that.

15 Do you want me -- can we go off the record for a minute?
16 Senator Schweiker. Yes.

17 (Discussion off the record.)

18 Mr. Wallach. Let's go back on the record.

19 Were you known to the FBI under your real name or under
20 an alias?

21 [] No, I was known to the FBI under my true
22 name. If you are wondering about whether the name is going
23 show up in the FBI records, I think they always would, in the
24 writing of reports, do not use the true names. In other words
25 to say, you know, source or confidential informant, or A-

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whatever it was called, and that is the way they write their reports.

Mr. Wallach. Let me ask you this. I realize this was a subject matter that was covered in your previous testimony. I deem it of relevance, and I would like to ask you here, were you aware on November 22nd, 1963, that the CIA had at some point in time prior to that date itself engaged in attempts to assassinate or used others in attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro?

[redacted] No. I think the basic answer to that question is no, but if you looked at my previous testimony, I previously said that in the case of this Cuban scandal over the years, I had acquired some knowledge of the fact that he existed and he was being run by my colleagues in Washington, but that was not known to me as a direct assassination operation. In other words, at one point in time I knew that Des Fitzgerald was going to meet this fellow. I knew at one point in time there was going to be a meeting in Spain. I knew at one point in time that we were putting caches in to support this particular fellow. I never knew whether the caches were recovered, and things like that. But the functional answer is no.

I have also previously testified that on some of the activities that were being engaged in by Mr. Harvey, that I was not knowledgeable on, you know, the thrust of those activities.

Mr. Wallach. Did your own sources in the Cuban community

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1 tell you that the, what we call the underworld, the Mafia,
2 was engaging in attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro?

3 [] I don't recall any such reports, but I've
4 explained this, and let me go again on this, that assassination,
5 the word "assassination" was part of the ambience of that
6 time. In other words, every Cuban that you talked to, nobody
7 could be involved in Cuban operations without having had
8 some sort of a discussion at some time with some Cuban who
9 said, gee, we ought to knock this guy off, or I'd shoot him if
10 I had the chance, or the way to create a revolution is to
11 shoot Fidel and Paul, and then go down through the whole
12 proposition. So the fact that somebody would talk about
13 assassination just wasn't anything that was really out of the
14 ordinary at the time. It was part of the climate. There
15 were professional revolutionaries in some cases, men who had
16 been in the 25th of July movement and left, and come in and
17 become exiles, and had been exiles two or three times.
18 Revolution and assassination was a way of life for them.

19 Mr. Wallach. Did you have any doubt in your mind that
20 Castro was aware in November 1961 that the CIA was supporting
21 these revolutionaries?

22 [] Supporting revolutionaries.

23 Mr. Wallach. Right.

24 [] Yes, I think Castro knew that the United
25 States was in touch with groups like the DRE, that people

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1 were being infiltrated by CIA into Cuba, because they apprehended
2 some of them.

3 Mr. Wallach. Groups that were trying to overthrow
4 Castro.

5 [] But he had to assume that if they were coming
6 in, they were setting up guerilla forces in places like
7 Oriente Province, and Pinar del Rio, that yes, they were going
8 to work to overthrow him, and he had to know that.

9 Mr. Wallach. Were you aware of any other country that
10 the United States Government was at that time attempting to
11 overthrow the government of, and we can get your answer off
12 the record if it is positive.

13 [] Well, wait a minute. Would you rephrase
14 that? I'm not sure I follow that particular one.

15 Mr. Wallach. You came back to me with the word assassi-
16 nation, said it was part of the ambience of the times, that
17 that might have been discussed at one time or another. My
18 belief, as a layman, had been I don't see that much of a
19 distinction between sending someone in who is going to try to
20 foment a revolution, the result of which would probably be
21 the death of Castro as opposed to sending someone in to --
22 don't want to get into this, but I think that may have been
23 something that you were leaning on.

24 In any event, are you aware of any other country, the
25 the U.S. at that time was directing attempts to overthrow it.

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1 government of?

2 [] No. Off the top of my head, no, but I
3 do want to come back to your point. I do think there is a
4 difference in the Latin American revolutionary sense of plotting
5 a revolution against somebody as opposed to plotting a
6 specific assassination operation against a particular individual.
7 You know, maybe we have an honest difference of opinion on that
8 point, but my view differs from yours.

9 Mr. Wallach. All right, let me continue on.

10 You also mentioned before that some of the people, the
11 people that you felt were making general policy, were Helms,
12 Bobby Kennedy, in one point Ed Lansdale.

13 [] Oh-ah.

14 Mr. Wallach. Did the Cubans know that? Did the Cubans
15 know that Bobby Kennedy was involved?

16 [] I don't know that they were at that point in
17 time, but clearly at later points of time when the Brigade 2506
18 returned, yes, they knew that Bobby Kennedy was in the Cuban
19 policy affairs. Leaders of the Brigade like Uribe, Oliva,
20 the Sin Juan brothers and others were brought to Washington
21 for lunches, dinners with, I guess at that time it was the
22 Attorney General, because there were various phases in this
23 thing.

24 Yes, they knew he was involved in Cuban affairs.

25 Mr. Wallach. Are you familiar with an article that J.

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1 in I think it was the September 7th issue of the New Orleans
2 Times-Picayune, among other newspapers, which reflected an
3 interview Castro had with Daniel Barker of the AP, within which
4 he said in substance that U.S. leaders would be in danger if
5 they continued in their attempts, I think he used the word
6 "eliminate".

7 [] Yes, I'm familiar with the general article,
8 yes, but I can't tell you with certainty that I was aware of
9 that article at the time that it appeared. In other words,
10 you're asking about 1961, did you say it appeared?

11 Mr. Wallach. September 7, 1961.

12 [] I cannot swear that I knew about it in 1961.
13 I since know that that article has been referred to a number of
14 times.

15 Mr. Johnston. Let me just state for the record that I
16 did not bring the WAVE cable on it, but WAVE did pass to head-
17 quarters the gist of that article as it appeared in Miami
18 articles, passed that information to headquarters either on
19 the 13th or 14th of November because the FBI was inquiring
20 about exile groups claiming that Castro had threatened Kennedy
21 anyway, so that at least WAVE had knowledge right after the
22 assassination of that article.

23 [] All right. The reason I qualify my response
24 that my have been a cable that would have been released by
25 some member of my staff. It didn't necessarily follow that

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1 was a WAVE cable, that I personally released it. I don't happen
2 to recall it, but I am familiar with the article and the thrust
3 of it.

4 Mr. Wallach. I realize again you may not have been familiar
5 with it at that time, or even before the assassination, but
6 what -- and I'm not asking specifically for what facts, but
7 you have testified previously that -- I don't want to paraphrase
8 your testimony, it speaks for itself -- that you had no reason
9 to believe that the Cubans were involved in the assassination
10 of President Kennedy.

11 [] Yes, at the time that the incident occurred,
12 and when Oswald was apprehended, I had no reason to believe
13 that the Cubans were involved.

14 Mr. Wallach. Taking the other side of the coin, what
15 evidence was there in your mind that they were not involved?

16 [] Well, because we didn't have any evidence
17 that they were.

18 Mr. Wallach. Did you conduct any investigation at all to
19 determine if there was any involvement?

20 [] I didn't have any starter for that. I don't
21 recall people were arrested. The FBI and the authorities in that
22 particular, in Dallas, were pursuing the case. I had no
23 starter to pursue that.

24 Mr. Wallach. Did you ever ask Mr. Holmes whether or not
25 you could conduct such an investigation, or did he ever tell

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1 you that you could or could not?
2 [] No, I answered that, that I don't recall
3 any such conversation where Helms told me I could or could not.
4 I mean, this was not a subject that was being discussed.
5 I think the frame of reference at the time was that this
6 was not a jurisdictional case for the CIA to pursue.
7 Mr. Wallach. You mean, the President of the United States
8 is murdered, and it is not within the jurisdiction of the CIA
9 to determine if a foreign country is involved?
10 [] Not if the investigation is run by the
11 FBI and a person is apprehended, and one is going to assume
12 that he is going to be interrogated, investigative leads are
13 going to be obtained from it, and a particular agency has got
14 the action responsibility. Under those circumstances, my
15 perception of the various rules is that CIA performs a support
16 function. In other words, if you are asked for a name
17 trace, or traces of telephone numbers, physical descriptions,
18 you know, license plates, whatever it may be, you respond.
19 Mr. Wallach. Who gave you those instructions, that
20 CIA was only going to have a support function?
21 [] That is my perception.
22 Mr. Wallach. Who told you that?
23 [] Nobody has to tell you that. You're an
24 intelligence human being. You're allowed to think for you-
25 and you can come to logical conclusions.

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Mr. Wallach. Did somebody tell you that the FBI had primary jurisdiction?

[] No, but the FBI has primary jurisdiction, this is something we are taught in our training courses, in the United States, you know, for cases in the United States. For instance, my explanation of this -- I gave you an explanation of the counterintelligence case in the States where we found a Cuban agent in the United States, and the jurisdiction of the case reverted to the FBI.

Senator Schweiker. Do you want to make a comment here, Seymour?

Mr. Bolton. I'd like to go off the record.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Schweiker. Let's go back on the record.

Mr. Wallach. I have one or two more questions on this.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

Mr. Wallach. Did at any time during the existence of the Warren Commission, do you recall -- and I'm not asking for a specific event, but do you recall having any type of indirect relationship with that Commission, in essence, responding to requests that were made of the Agency and they asking you for general information?

[] Would you give me the dates of the Warren Commission?

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Mr. Wallach. December 1, '63 --

December 1, '63 to when?

Mr. Wallach. September of '64.

No. No.

Mr. Wallach. Do you have any reason today to believe that there was Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy?

I have no hard information on that.

Mr. Wallach. Do you have any hearsay information?

No. I mean, hearsay information, what constitutes hearsay? Criel wrote an article in the Washington Post, you know, suggesting that there is some -- is that hearsay evidence? I mean, I don't happen to believe his thesis.

Mr. Wallach. I am asking you if you have any belief as an expert?

As an expert I only deal in facts, in other words not -- what I consider hard intelligence, I don't have any hard intelligence.

Mr. Johnston. Other than the FBI, did you have a liaison with other investigative agencies?

Yes, I did.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have an investigative relationship with the U.S. Customs Department, specifically a Customs agent who was on detail to CIA?

Yes, we had a relationship with a Customs

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JOHN A. O'SHEA, JR., MAY 1956, D.D. 2303

20 [] He did stay in contact with Cuban exile
21 groups because it was part of his job to know when they were
22 going out so that we didn't have these uncoordinated problems.
23 In other words, at one point we tried to stop them. As a
24 matter of fact, we knew who was in the area running a training camp or
25 something like that, so that our operations would not be

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1 compromised by coming into a camp next to where some exiled
2 Cubans were already working.

3 Mr. Johnston. And did he -- let me back up. First, have
4 you participated in the Agency's response to the Committee's
5 written inquiry about this?

6 [] Well, to this extent, somebody in the Agency
7 called me and said the Committee had a request in for some
8 data on a Customs officer. Nobody could remember his name. I
9 happened to remember his name. I said [] was the
10 guy's name. I don't remember how to spell it. Phonetically
11 I think it is as follows, and try to find a file on it. And
12 so to that extent, yes, I am aware that there was some sort of
13 a response being prepared. I did not see the response. I
14 don't know what it says.

15 Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether he was asked either by
16 you or by anybody in WAVE to contact Cuban exiles after the
17 assassination to see what knowledge they might have?

18 [] Well, let me try to clarify that. I was
19 not his contact point. In other words, I was a manager of a
20 large operation.

21 Mr. Johnston. I understand that. So did anybody under
22 your control contact him?

23 [] His point of contact was in Key West. Per-
24 sults he would either come to Miami or meet with one of our
25 people, and once every three months or something like that.

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1 would have a meeting with him to review broad trends, either
2 in Key West or in Miami. I never took him with this type of
3 thing. I don't recall anybody else in the station tasking him
4 to conduct an investigation of Cuban groups relative to the
5 President's assassination. But as we were putting together
6 mood cables -- you showed me an example of one there -- it is
7 conceivable that he is the kind of person that we would have
8 talked to to find out what was going on in the Cuban community
9 at that time.

10 Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether he did in fact contact
11 Cuban exiles about it? Do you have any knowledge of his contact
12 Cuban exiles?

13 I don't have any firsthand knowledge.

14 Mr. Johnston. Do you have any knowledge whatsoever?

15 I would have to say firsthand, I don't
16 recall any information of any subordinate of mine reporting
17 me that he had done that.

18 Mr. Johnston. You testified earlier that you met with
19 Mr. Fitzgerald at some point, and that he told you at that
20 time that he made contact personally with a Cuban agent, now
21 named AMLAS?

22 I think my testimony was something along
23 line, that I had a conversation with Fitzgerald, that he was
24 going to meet a Cuban source. My recollection was that the
25 name may have come up, that he was asking my opinion, and at

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1 as to whether this would be a useful thing to do. And as I
2 have testified before, my recollection is I told him I thought
3 I would find this conversation interesting, but I didn't think
4 it was worth his doing because he had too high a profile, and
5 it would not be a good thing to do from the point of view of
6 attribution in relationship to a clandestine agent.

7 Mr. Johnston. And let me go through what you have just
8 told me.

9 First of all, was this agent, when he used the true
10 name, was it the agent whose cryptonym is AMLASH?

11 [] Yes. Subsequently I have concluded that that
12 is who it is.

13 Mr. Johnston. Did he tell you or indicate that a meeting
14 between him and AMLASH was proposed?

15 [] Well, he was considering a meeting with
16 AMLASH, with this particular person.

17 Mr. Johnston. Do you have a recollection as to what
18 timeframe your discussion with Mr. Fitzgerald was?

19 [] No, I don't.

20 Mr. Johnston. Knowing that Mr. Fitzgerald met with
21 AMLASH on October 29th, 1963, does that refresh your recollection
22 as to whether the conversation took place earlier in 1963?

23 [] I am sorry, I can't narrow that down for
24 you.

25 Mr. Johnston. But you advised against the meeting.

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[redacted] Right.

Mr. Johnston. You were knowledgeable, I take it, of the Agency's dealing with AMLASH from time to time, as part of JMWAVE.

[redacted] Yes. I mentioned to you earlier that we had put in caches which were scheduled to be retrieved by AMLASH or his people, so yes, I knew that we were providing support to an agent in Cuba, but that was not unusual because we were putting in a large number of caches for a wide variety of people who were being run out of Washington, over and out of other stations.

Mr. Johnston. And you may have testified about this before but was it common to drop caches of rifles or telescopic sights for agents?

[redacted] I could not necessarily have known what was in each cache.

Mr. Johnston. Well, was it common to drop, to your knowledge, to drop rifles with telescopic sights?

[redacted] Well, I think the thing that would be uncommon would be telescopic sights. Many of our caches were weapons caches. A large bulk of the caches were rifles of one kind or another. We put in the FAL, the Belgian FAL, we put in M-1s. We put in carbines, we put in Springfields, we put in Thompson submachine guns. I think if I were looking at a cache list and I saw a telescope on it matched up with a

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1 Springfield '03 rifle, that probably would have struck me as
2 being unusual, but I did not see the inventories of all the
3 caches.

4 Mr. Johnston. Would you commonly or routinely see cables
5 from the Director, especially on the AMBLASH operation?

6 No.

7 From the Director to whom?

8 Mr. Johnston. To JMWAVE.

9 My recollection is, other than specific
10 requests to put in caches, that there wasn't any cable traffic
11 between Washington and JMWAVE on that particular operation.

12 Mr. Johnston. I am searching through my notes --

13 Right.

14 Mr. Johnston. The Committee does not have copies of the
15 file of AMBLASH. That is at the Agency. Let me, if you'll
16 accept it as a fact that there was a cable in early December
17 1963 from the Director to JMWAVE directing, using the crypt
18 AMBLASH and directing that a cache be supplied him, including
19 in that, itemizing two rifles with telescopic sights.

20 What kind of a cache I may or may not have
21 seen. In other words, that would have been a fairly standard
22 logistics kind of thing to get a cache and it would have come
23 up on my briefing chart for the month, the operation, X days
24 of days before the operation was launched, I would have had
25 a briefing with all of the paramilitary and maritime officers

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1 and our COMINT, ELINT and other specialists to look at the CV
2 and make a decision as to whether the operation should go or
3 not go. At that point I probably would have known that it was
4 a cache, that it contained weapons, that it was in support of
5 a headquarters run operation.

6 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall on or about 7 or 8 December
7 1963 a stop being put on operations, certain operations that
8 went into Cuba?

9 [] I don't recall that specific timeframe, but
10 there were periodic ups and downs in the number of operations
11 that could be run. We would get policy guidance to stand
12 down for a period of time, that once one of those things came
13 out, I think that we had a series of discussions, I think, in
14 Washington, not appeals, that if there was a standdown, and
15 we had to say something, we were dependent on us in Cuba
16 for food and a continuing flow of weapons, that we couldn't
17 have them preparing these caches and risking their lives to
18 come to the reception points and not be able to meet the
19 schedules.

20 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall, though, in the period 6, 7
21 and 8 December, headquarters first authorizing certain
22 operations and then calling off the operations, and specifying
23 cables which said, and I quote -- pardon me, I don't quote,
24 the operation being called off, "pending major top level
25 Cuban-Caribbean policy review scheduled early next week which.

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1 should provide basis for decision.

2 [] I don't recall your specific dates or your
3 timeframe, but the point I would like to leave with you is that
4 there were several periods like that where we had ups and downs,
5 and yes, I do recall standdowns on operations.

6 Mr. Johnston, you don't recall a standdown within two
7 weeks of the assassination of President Kennedy.

8 [] I am sorry, I don't. You know, I accept that
9 it occurred, but you know, there were so many of those during
10 the three and a half year period of time that I don't recall
11 that specific one.

12 Mr. Johnston. What does the phrase "higher authority"
13 generally mean in Agency cables?

14 [] Well, at that particular point in time, I
15 think higher authority was a euphemism for the President and
16 top level policy decision-makers at the NSC 40 Committee level.

17 Mr. Johnston. And again, you don't recall knowing in
18 the same time period, December 1961, that you were cabled that
19 the headquarters procedure was to present the infiltration
20 procedures to higher authority.

21 [] Well, I have forgotten the date when this
22 transition took place. As of a fixed date, in the course
23 of this operation, we had to supply all of our infiltration
24 operations a month in advance. I'm sorry, I just don't
25 recall when that went into effect. Prior to that time we were

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WAVE 8-10-68

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1 pretty well scheduling these ourselves, but then a request
2 came in that we put these in a month in advance. So as I
3 told you before, if I wanted to run a schedule for October, I
4 had to have it in in Washington with all of the Ops plans
5 by I think the 15th of September.

6 Senator Schweiker. Did a former ambassador William
7 Pauley, a man called William Pauley, who at one time owned
8 properties in Havana and now living in Miami, did he ever
9 finance some of the operations that you are aware of out of
10 Miami, William Pauley?

11 [] Yes, I know Bill Pauley. He was involved in,
12 in my time, in one specific operational activity. I don't
13 think it would be proper to say that he financed it, however.

14 Senator Schweiker. This is the one where people were
15 killed in a boat raid?

16 [] Well, we don't know what happened to them.
17 My recollection of the operation is that Bill Pauley was
18 approached by Life Magazine, and this was involved with an
19 individual by the name of John Martino, because this has come
20 up recently. The Committee has asked me about this before I
21 told them at first I couldn't remember the name, and I had
22 to go back and conduct a file search, and I came up with
23 John Martino's name, who had been involved in gambling casino
24 in Cuba.

25 Martino was in touch with a number of Cubans who

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1 claimed that they had access to two Soviet missile technicians.
2 Pauley brought this operation to the Agency, and the Agency
3 agreed that we would cooperate with them in pursuit of this
4 operation.

5 Senator Schweiker. And Time-Life did some funding for
6 it, too?

7 [] Well, they were involved, but they did not
8 fund it. My recollection is Pauley made the boat available,
9 the Flying Tiger, which was his yacht, we paid for the gas and
10 oil for that particular boat, and we provided all of the other
11 equipment that went into the operation. Pauley went on that
12 vessel down to the launch point. The men were launched in a
13 small infiltration boat. It took off, went off toward the
14 Cuban mainland, and were never seen or heard from since then.
15 We never had any reporting on them.

16 Senator Schweiker. Was Pauley involved with other
17 operations with you folks, or is that the only one?

18 [] That is the only operation that he was
19 involved with the Agency. He, however, was very helpful in
20 terms of providing advice on various people that he had known
21 from his long involvement in Cuba. He was useful in providing
22 introductions to various people that we wanted to meet. I
23 recall on one occasion he introduced me to a prominent Cuban
24 that I wanted to meet. He brokered that.

25 Pauley, on his own, gave money to various Cuban groups.

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1 unrelated to what ~~we~~ were doing. He was also a participant
2 in the raising of the initial ransom for the members of
3 Brigade 2306.

4 Senator Schweiker. Here is an article -- rather than me read
5 it, I'll give you a chance to read it. It is Claire Booth
6 Luce. As you know, she is on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory
7 Board, and has been for some time, and Bill Colby was her
8 chief of station when she was ambassador to Italy. This
9 story came to me not through the paper, frankly, but from
10 Mrs. Luce personally, expressing her concern. It subsequently
11 did appear in a paper and I did not release it. Mrs. Luce
12 specifically released it to Betty Seale, and the reason it is
13 relevant here is that from what I read here, the group she
14 is referring to is probably the BRE group or some part of
15 the BRE group in New Orleans, and while that is not too clear,
16 she did associate Mr. William Pauley with it. But that is
17 somewhat confused, because you said he wasn't involved in any
18 other operation other than the one you mentioned.

19 Well, I'm -- Mr. Pauley, I know Mr. Pauley
20 and Mrs. Luce are friends. They see each other, or they used to.
21 I haven't seen them in a number of years, but they used to
22 be in the same social circuit, so I am sure that Mr. Pauley
23 recounted a war story in his contacts, so she is probably
24 aware of the general operation to get the two Soviets out of
25 Cuba. That is the only operation that he ran with us during

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1 my stewardship of the station.

2 Senator Schweiker. There is a vast difference of recollec-
3 tion between the two on what happened. She very strongly
4 recollects that in addition to the thing that you described,
5 which is a matter of record, by the way, with the Senate
6 Committee, it is a matter of Committee record, in addition to
7 that, that this is in it also.

8 Rather than read the whole thing, you might read the
9 paragraphs I have outlined. She feels very strongly about it.
10 She has called me several times about it. She is absolutely
11 certain of her information, and her Cuban source doesn't want
12 to talk for fear of his life.

13 (The Witness reads the document.)

14 No, that doesn't ring any bells. I cannot
15 put that in any context.

16 Let me go back to this Pauley business. I think at one
17 time, one other thing that Pauley did for us, I think he
18 provided an opportunity for us to pick up some cargo in the
19 Dominican Republic to provide cover for one of our vessels that
20 we were using at that time for infiltration operations in the
21 area but those are the only things that I can remember off the
22 top of my head.

23 Senator Schweiker. You see, where he says here that he
24 contact with a group, the story goes on to say that this
25 group supplied a tape and pictures of that contact, and that

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1 FBI did not follow them up, which is a rather serious charge
2 itself, and that is why I wonder if there is some DRE relation-
3 ship here with Bringuier.

4 Maybe you can give us that case officer's name, Seymour.
5 Mr. Bolton. Which one?

6 Senator Schweiker. The case officer for the DRE group.
7 It would have to be the one at the time when Oswald was
8 in New Orleans, which is -- when was that?

9 Mr. Johnston. The fall of '63.

10 (Discussion off the record.)

11 Senator Schweiker. Going on, I didn't follow the final
12 question on DeStada, your detail man to Customs.

13 Were you aware that he was doing some investigating
14 after the Kennedy assassination?

15 [] No, I don't have any firsthand recollection
16 of that.

17 Senator Schweiker. And the way you were structured, would
18 he be the logical person to, if somebody asked for either a
19 name check or some follow-up --

20 [] He would have been the logical person if we
21 had something specific to pursue or he would have been the
22 logical person to put a question to if we were looking for
23 atmospheric, you know, what the Cuban community was thinking.

24 Senator Schweiker. How about Julio Lobo?

25 [] He's the sugar king.

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
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Q Yes, it does.

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Senator Schweiker. And it was a project where two American pilots were killed. The group conducted some paramilitary operation.

[redacted] That doesn't ring a bell, but the Celula Fantasma is a name that I've heard. I can't put it into any broader context for you. It certainly was not one of our operations.

Senator Schweiker. That was really my question.

Do you recall -- was there anyone using the name or
cryptoname of Bishop for you at any point in time in terms of
the Cuban operations, either Morris Bishop or some other
Bishop?

"That is not decent" - mean anything to me.

Senator Gurnea: There is a sketch of a person. Does this sketch look like anyone that might have been associated with Cuban operations, either pro-Castro or anti-Castro?

(The Witness looks at a sketch.)

[redacted] No, it doesn't. I mean, there is something about the face that is familiar, but I can't put a name to it and it doesn't ring any bells with me ... relationship to ... needs operation.

September. He'll ask you.

GEYRE 45. HOW ABOUT YOU, AN. 45. 127.104?

THE ABOVE IS SUPPOSED TO BE THE END OF THE MATTER.

Senator Schweiker. I think an American, but I'm not c

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1 on that, someone who did do some work in the Cuban activities,
2 supposedly on the anti-Castro side.

3 Mr. Bolton. He has very regular features, so he could
4 be almost anybody, you know.

5 And like John says, it is a sort of -- he could be familiar.
6 No, I wouldn't place him with anyone I know.

7 Senator Schweiker. Go ahead.

8 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall Director McCone visiting the
9 station in early December or mid-December of 1963?

10 [] Mr. McCone made a couple of visits to
11 Florida. I'm not sure it would be fair to say that he
12 visited the station. My recollection of that is he came to
13 Florida. He was not at the property that we had, we had
14 conversations with him at that property, but he didn't
15 come out to the physical plant, that is, our station premises,
16 and in most cases he was usually en route to or coming back
17 from somewhere.

18 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall such a visit in December of
19 1963?

20 [] I can't pin it down to that timeframe. In
21 other words, my memory is McCone came to Miami several times.

22 Mr. Johnston. Well, let's put it in the timeframe of
23 short period after the assassination of President Kennedy.

24 [] I cannot put it into the timeframe, I
25 can't. All I can tell you is McCone came down to Florida in

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1 a number of occasions. You know, if you asked me what your
2 impression, I don't know, maybe three, four.

3 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall anyone from headquarters
4 coming down to visit with you in December 1963? Again, that
5 is shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy.

6 [redacted] Do you have the chronology? Was Harvey
7 still --

8 Mr. Johnston. No, it was Fitzgerald.

9 [redacted] Okay. No, I don't, because Harvey periodically
10 when he was in used to come down at the time of the Orange
11 Bowl game. I do remember going to an Orange Bowl game with
12 Harvey. So I would have to say no, I don't.

13 But look again --

14 Mr. Johnston. Well, let me just back up.

15 Do you know -- did you have any discussions with anyone
16 from the headquarters staff about the effect of the assassination
17 of President Kennedy on Cuban operations?

18 [redacted] Well, it seems to me logical that there
19 would have been a sort of discussion at the time, but I don't
20 recall it. But then, you have to put it in this kind of
21 text. I was a very strong supporter of the Cuban
22 revolution. I came to Washington on a regular basis. There
23 were times when I would come up once every two weeks. There
24 were times when I wouldn't be in the office for six weeks, and
25 this was a very active period. I was working 14, 15, 16 hours

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1 Mr. Johnston. Do you recall such a discussion with
2 Mr. Helms?

3 [] No, I have to come back to the basic point.
4 I don't recall this kind of specific conversation with a
5 particular individual, but I am sure that these kinds of
6 conversations must have taken place with somebody from Washing-
7 ton or when I was up here in Washington.

8 Mr. Johnston. Let me show you the cable that you looked
9 at previously before we went on the record, which is WAVE cable
10 8130 of 24 November 1963, and the copy we have is barely
11 legible. The gist of that is the last numbered paragraph
12 reports information WAVE obtained of an individual named
13 Rodriguez in Dallas, and then, I think, reports, if you can
14 read through the poor wiring, that Rodriguez was thought to
15 be anti-Kennedy.

16 My question being, where would you have gotten that
17 kind of information?

18 (The witness reads the document.)

19 [] Well, to be honest with you, I can't read
20 the message. It says read Para 2, AWTOR. We'd have to
21 go up and look up who the man is. This is one of literally
22 thousands of cryptonyms across my desk.

23 It looks to me like AWTOR.

24 Mr. Johnston. Let's go on the record.

25 (Discussion off the record.)

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7400070391

WAVE & PAVE

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TOP SECRET

1 [] HAVE traces, now, that indicates to me that
2 whatever ~~was~~ done here was based on the material that was
3 passively in the files.

4 Where did material that was in our files. We got material
5 that was in these files from agent reporting, we got it from
6 refugee debriefings, we got it from our, you know, from
7 sources in the Cuban community who were reporting on Cuban
8 groups. We got it on a monitoring of the Cuban press, and the
9 Spanish press in Miami, we got it from monitoring radio broad-
10 casts and so forth. So that it was this kind of a conglomerate
11 of information.

12 Now, let's take a name, you know, like Rodriguez. A
13 name like Rodriguez in the card file, there might be two
14 inches of Rodriguezes. You know, if you were looking for a
15 specific Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, you know, something
16 like that, then you'd have to pin it down, in other words,
17 age, what his membership was in the party and things like that.
18 So that indicates to me that we found this material in the
19 file.

20 Was the source is, I don't know. We'd have to look in
21 the crypt and find the code name, and maybe even then I don't
22 tell you.

23 Mr. Johnston. But that source is liable to be a file
24 source in Miami, is that correct?

25 [] Well, not being able to read the name.

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67

1 don't even want to speculate on it.

2 Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources in Alpha 667

3 [] Yes, at times there were sources in Alpha 667.

4 Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources in SNFET?

5 [] At times, yes.

6 Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources, in the time period
7 we are talking about, November '63 through the spring of 1964?

8 [] Well, I would have to say the probability
9 is high that we had some sort of a source in that group, but
10 I'd have to go back, you know, and check the record, and it
11 would have to be researched, but my recollection to that is
12 we would have known in that group one way or another.

13 Mr. Johnston. Are you aware of a Cuban exile organization
14 or anti-Cast organization called the Christian Democratic
15 Movement, or that?

16 [] Yes, I am.

17 Mr. Johnston. And you have sources in ABC?

18 [] Yes, we did.

19 Mr. Johnston. And in November 1963, do you recall
20 who was the leadership of ABC?

21 [] Off the top of my head, no, but you know
22 there is a book, we put out a book at that time which was
23 about the work of all of the anti-Castro groups that were
24 located in Miami. In the figures are still with our
25 printed, there were 250 some-odd exile groups, and

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主 持 人 王 建 明

didn't have all 250 penetrated, if you really want to know the answer to that. We'll have to get the book, look up the dates, and try to see who the leadership were.

Mr. Johnston. Does that book contain the names of the leadership?

[redacted] Yes. In most of the cases it contains the names of the major leaders.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have that book at approximately the timeperiod of November '63 through December '63?

[redacted] The book was put out and revised several times. I just have trouble coming with specific dates.

27. John, Jr. 's presence was not unusual in

things now coming, and that the only way I know to answer you in a prudent manner is to say that there was such a group. I steer you to the source of it. You know, we can look it up for you.

The subject, Dr. Giovanni Maria Corbelli-Villa was
born at Corbelli, Italy.

$$\frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x) e^{-x^2} dx = \frac{1}{\sqrt{\pi}} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(x) e^{-x^2} dx$$

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[illegible]
$$\lambda \in \mathbb{R}^n \text{ such that } \lambda_1 = \dots = \lambda_n = 0 \text{ and } \lambda_i \neq 0 \text{ for some } i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$$
[illegible]

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69

(The Witness read the document.)

[redacted] No, I don't. You know, the cryptonym AMKNOB rings a bell with me. I am familiar with the cryptonym. And specifically AMKNOB 1 is I can't tell you. Reading the contents of this message, you know, this is a message dated 4 December '63, I would say that we got a message in secret writing via the mail from some source in Cuba, and he is giving this information.

Who he is, what reliability we placed on a particular source --

Mr. Johnston: That's what I'm asking you.

[redacted] Well, I was in the room and so forth, I couldn't tell you. Well, you know, get the file. I would like to read it and see what the file says.

Mr. Johnston: And in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy, when you get information like that, you viewed your responsibility as what?

[redacted] Essentially, it is to headquarters. I would like to pull together all files and try to find out what would be the best way to handle the situation.

Mr. Johnston: And again, the assistance of the CIA in the reporting to you, especially during the assassination.

[redacted] Yes, in the context, I would say that I don't want you to hold me to this, and

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● 2010年12月10日

Q Mr. Johnston. Well, that's a correct statement of the message, is that right?

11 I am alone. Then I put the question in regard
12 to the possibility of having the station in Cuba, and
13 the answer was that it was not possible at all. You will
14 see that the answer to the question is that so far

16 [redacted] now, with a message like this it is coming.
17 You'd have to look back at the file, and where there are
18 references and questions, you know, like who are these people,
19 and so forth. If the reference is that it is received, and
20 then, after that, all the time, it is only a
21 matter of time to go back to the file.

... ..
... ..
... ..

1. The first step is to identify the problem or question that needs to be answered. This involves understanding the context and the specific requirements of the task.

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2010年12月10日

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72

Board of Directors' Meeting

Figure 10. The effect of the initial concentration of the monomer on the polymerization of **1**. [AIBN] = 0.01 mol/L; [CuBr₂] = 0.005 mol/L; [Ligand] = 0.01 mol/L; [M]₀/[CuBr₂]/[Ligand] = 100/1/1; T = 60 °C; t = 2 h.

2 [redacted] I would have to say because of the indicator
3 on here, the communication system was very reliable, that
4 this message was received, because that's what it shows, but
5 personally have no recollection of this message.

It says the move is from a KNULSER diplomat. I assume
that that was from a Mexican diplomat. Italian?

Mr. Johnston, and only evaluation you could ...

[illegible][illegible]

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72

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[redacted]

Or what was the message, how was it sent,
what was the text of the message.

Senator Schweiker. What was your relationship with a
group called the Free Cuba Committee that I believe was organized
through the Hellen Company here in Washington?

[redacted]

Could you give me some additional information?

Was this Bethel, Paul Bethel, the Free Cuba Committee?

Senator Schweiker. Well, again I believe Mrs. Luce
was involved with this Committee as well, and there were some
others.

Who is Paul Bethel?

[redacted]

Paul Bethel was a person who had been
employed by the Central Intelligence Agency and later came to the
and was very active in the Free Cuba Committee.

Senator Schweiker. Well, I am not sure. It might have
been. I can't recall the names.

[redacted]

Well, the Free Cuba Committee, as such, was

not a formal organization, it was a loose organization.
It was organized by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
people who were involved in the operation of the
organization, and you have to be very close with the
people who are involved.

[redacted]

Yes, I have to say, yes, the people who

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Now about the ... they ... the committee? Well, what
your probably ... of relationship forgetting Oswald ...
did you not ... since they obviously had some foreign
intelligence relationship?

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1 American flight coming into the United States, and the
2 refugees coming to identify agents on that, identify agents
3 who might be trying to penetrate our paramilitary forces
4 one of our collection of operations.

5 We also were looking at Cuban intelligence officers who
6 were stationed overseas, in other words, could our debriefing
7 of knowledgeable people result in our identifying, let's say,
8 the DDI guy in Mexico City or in Madrid? We could then
9 mount an operation on the basis of that to recruit him, to
10 maintain him in place as a source within the Cuban intelligence
11 service. It was that kind of counterintelligence approach.

12 I know, for example, of the Cuban service, Barbara [redacted]
13 the [redacted] people [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
14 [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
15 [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
16 then I'd like to [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
17 you just give [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

18 In the [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
19 [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]
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75

Phone Area 202 544 6000

WABO A PAUL

760 3097071

410 Paul Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1 tied in to say the CIA.

2 No, that doesn't ring any bells with me.

3 Senator Schweiker. Then there is a [redacted]

4 [redacted] He's a --

5 Senator Schweiker. Florida banker. He was involved in
6 paramilitary or some kind of operations.

7 [redacted] Well, there were two phrases. [redacted]

8 was involved in the Bay of Pigs operation, in cleaning up some
9 claims that the families of one or two of the pilots had who
10 crashed involved in the Bay of Pigs. And I would have known
11 that through the file.

12 [redacted] later was in touch with me at the time when
13 I was in the Miami station, and he provided, as I recall,
14 he had real estate interests, banks, and he helped us create
15 some cover companies through which we bought or leased such
16 things as dock space at marinas for boats and items like that.

17 Senator Schweiker. Okay.

18 Do you have anything else on the record?

19 Mr. Connelly. Just one more thing.

20 Now major a role did you have with [redacted] and
21 any personal contacts did you have with him?

22 [redacted] My recollection would be that I probably
23 only met him once or twice personally, but you know, you
24 have to understand this, at that time, our major cover in
25 Miami was a commercial company. I was a vice president of

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1 that company. As a result, I traveled extensively in the
2 business social community. At that point we had one of the
3 larger covert payrolls in South Miami, and I was a member of
4 a number of clubs, and people like Belowell I would meet
5 at cocktail parties or dinners, you know, or the yacht club
6 that I belonged to or whatever, but officially, in terms of
7 business sense, I only recall talking with [redacted] twice, I
8 think.

9 Senator Schweiker. Would he look anything like that
10 picture?

11 (The Witness looks at the sketch.)

12 [redacted] No. At that time he would have been much
13 heavier.

14 Mr. Johnston. Did you ever discuss the Kennedy assassi-
15 nation with him?

16 [redacted] No, I wouldn't have. I wouldn't have talked
17 about that. My recollection of the kind of things that I would
18 have talked about with [redacted] would have been the formation
19 of some cover company, the purchase of a boat, the rental of
20 term lease of you know large pieces of acreage for training
21 bases and things like that. That's about what I recall of
22 [redacted] relationship with him at the time.

23 Mr. Johnston. I guess I just have a little bit of
24 trouble, and that is with your recollection of conversing
25 with him, but you don't recall whether you talked

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11. The following are the names of the people who were present at the meeting:

1 to McCone or Helms about a connection between the Kennedy
2 assassination and the Cuban operation.
3 [redacted] Well, you know, some of these things make
4 different kinds of impact on you. I mean, [redacted] was in the
5 part of the country where we were located was an important
6 figure. He had a bank not too far from where we were located
7 many of our people did their banking with him, and so forth.
8 And he's a name that sticks out.
9 Mr. Johnston. I thought that Mr. Helms and Mr. McCone
10 would also make an impression.
11 [redacted] Well, McCone, yes, you know, I went to those
12 meetings with McCone in Washington and other places, and I see
13 I don't mean this to sound blasé, but a visit of the Director
14 to a place you recall, but you don't necessarily recall the
15 exact circumstances of it. I've had lots of visits at stations
16 that I've been in from Directors. I've been involved in
17 Presidential visits and Vice Presidential visits, and you know
18 I can tell you when the Presidents came to Vietnam or elsewhere
19 and you will know that we would have been there, and
20 I'll remember it.
21 Mr. Johnston. Suppose I wanted to know, you go back
22 from the exact date of meeting with Mr. Helms or Mr. McCone
23 Helms, did you know whether they had a discussion with each other
24 the relationship between the assassination of President
25 Kennedy and the covert operations against them.

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[redacted] I don't recall it.

Mr. Johnston. Is it you don't recall such a discussion, having such a discussion, or you have a recollection and your recollection is there were no discussions.

[redacted] No, I don't recall such a discussion. That's what I've said several times. I assume that such discussions took place, but frankly, I don't recall them.

Senator Schweiker. All right, that's all we have. We appreciate your cooperation and your testimony. I do want to ask for some guidance off the record.

Whereupon, at 4:40 o'clock p.m., the interview in the above-entitled matter was concluded.

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